Democrats need to pick a strategy and soon

Well, I know it has been a long while since I have posted but I check up with DCAT frequently and thought I would drop by to discuss something that has been going on under the radar lately and that is the Democratic strategy for victory in the coming years.

The current debate about Democratic strategy has less to do with specific policies (Iraq, for example, or immigration) and more to do with grand strategy. The debate is best exemplified by two men: Howard Dean, head of the DNC, and Representative Rahm Emanuel, head of the DCCC. In a headline that should reinforce the rank-and-file’s frustration over the inability of Democrats to unite, the Washington Post noted that “Democrats Are Fractured Over Strategy, Funds.”

“The blowup,” according to the Post, “highlights a long-standing tension that has pitted Democratic congressional leaders, who are focused on their best opportunities for electoral gains this fall, against Dean and many state party chairmen, who believe that the party needs to be rebuilt from the ground up -- even in states that have traditionally been Republican strongholds."

Here are the sides:

1) Dean’s 50-state strategy:

Howard Dean took a lot of heat during the 2004 primaries when he said that “White folks in the South who drive pickup trucks with Confederate flag decals on the back ought to be voting with us, and not [Republicans], because their kids don't have health insurance either, and their kids need better schools too,” but as head of the DNC, he has pledged to compete in all 50 states. Says Dean, “The Democratic Party is committed to winning elections at every level in every region of the country, and we're getting started right now with a massive effort to fund organizers on the ground in every state.”

Sounds great, right? The problem is that in order to do this, he has to spend lots of money (which, by the way, he has raised far more than skeptics once thought).

From the Post article:
“Many Washington Democrats think Dean is unwise to spend on field organizers and other staff in states where House and Senate candidates have little chance of winning. Dean has maintained that the party cannot strengthen itself over the long haul unless it competes everywhere.

Dean, arguing for a long-term perspective, said that the party must become a presence everywhere, even in very Republican states in the South and the Mountain West. He was elected on an outsider's platform that promised a "50-state strategy" as the best way to revitalize a party routed from both the White House and Congress during most of the Bush years. "We have gone from election to election, and, if we don't win, then we've dug ourselves into a deep hole and we have nothing to start with," he said. "That is a cycle that has to be broken.”

2) Emanuel’s “let’s-win-elections” strategy:

“The way you build long-term is to succeed short-term,” Rahm Emanuel says, countering Dean’s strategy.

“Emanuel, Schumer and other Democratic operatives anticipate that the better-funded Republican Party structure and its allies will flood competitive states and districts with money, television ads and other resources.”

Of course, this does not mean the Democrats should not try to appeal to Republican voters. Just today, the New York Times reported that “House Democrats, trying to capitalize on conservative dissatisfaction with Republicans, are reaching out to Christian voters with radio advertisements critical of Republican proposals to overhaul Social Security.” Trying to take advantage of the current dissatisfaction among conservatives about government spending, the war in Iraq, and the current immigration debate, this makes sense.

The major difference between the 2 strategies is which is more important: the long term goal of building Democratic support in Republican strongholds like Alabama and Texas, or winning elections in swing districts in places like Pennsylvania and Ohio. Both Dean and Emanuel make good points.

On the one hand, had more money been put in Ohio in 2004, Kerry might have gotten the 60,000 votes more to capture the presidency and from there, perhaps reignite Democratic hopes for Congress. Furthermore, public confidence in Republicans has plunged to the lowest levels yet, with "Americans saying by wide margins that they now trust Democrats more than Republicans to deal with Iraq, the economy, immigration and other issues, according to a Washington Post-ABC News poll that underscores the GOP's fragile grip on power six months before the midterm elections." Should Democrats really let 2006 and perhaps even 2008 fall to chance while worrying about building a new coalition for 2010 or 2012?

On the other hand, so long as Democrats stay on the defensive, Republicans will continue eating into traditionally Democratic voters such as Hispanics and Catholics (both of which defected to the Republicans in large numbers in 2004). Plus the fact that many Republican voters, particularly economic conservatives who favor fiscal responsibility, poor whites who could be convinced to support healthcare and education policies, and foreign policy conservatives who once shunned being the world's police and could find themselves comfortable in a Democratic platform. These people will not convert unless properly targeted and mobilized.

Assuming that Democrats can’t do both (and financially speaking, they really can’t), which tract should they pursue? I leave that question open for others to ponder.