Northern Ireland, Peace, and the South African Example

There is probably no better major newspaper in America when it comes to the issue of Northern Ireland than The Boston Globe. That probably should come as no surprise given Boston's affinity for and association with the Irish. The Globe's editorial this past week on the ongoing transitions in Northern Ireland, in which the lion has laid down with the lamb, or at least Sinn Fein and the Democratic Unionist Party have gotten the provincial legislature off the ground at Stormont, is perceptive. Here is the money excerpt:

Milestones toward peace in Northern Ireland seem to arrive every six months, but until now they have not produced the breakthrough that would bring tranquility to the six counties. This time, however, the amity between Sinn Fein and the Democratic Unionist Party seemed genuine as they re-started the provincial government Tuesday. If these old adversaries can get along with no more than the usual friction among coalition partners, the conflict really is over.

Some might raise eyebrows over where the Globe gives credit:

Credit for reconciling the extreme wing of Irish nationalism to nonviolent politics goes to Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness, his chief lieutenant and deputy first minister in the provincial government. They were among the leaders of the Irish Republican Army (Adams denies this but few believe him), and they realized more than two decades ago that the IRA could not win the war against unionism and Britain.

Despite its potentially controversial implications, this last point is worth emphasizing: The IRA could not win the war, a war, against the British. But I am reminded of the circumstances in South Africa in the late 1980s and early 1990s when most observers were well aware that the ANC could not win a war against the South African Defense Forces, the South African Police, and the other elements of the security apparatus. But there was a flip side to that coin: Neither could the South Africans completely crush the opposition movement. And so stasis led to change. Similarly in Northern Ireland, the British were never going to be able to crush entirely the IRA and its affiliated allies. And so stasis led to change. The analogy is not perfect of course -- historical analogies rarely are -- and yet its broad contours ring true. It will be easy to be warily cynical about the peace process in Northern Ireland, and yet if ever a time existed for optimism, however cautious, to trump pessimism, this seems to be it.